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1. Introduction 
Relativity is one of the most overfished streams in the history of science. Albert Einstein has 
doubtless graced the covers of more monographs than any other scientist—possibly save Charles 
Darwin—in the decade since the 2005 centenary of his annus mirabilis. I was skeptical that Jimena 
Canales would be able land new catch from such thoroughly exploited waters. The physicist and the 
philosopher proved that skepticism misplaced. By exploring a decades-long feud that pitted Albert 
Einstein against the French savant Henri Bergson, Canales shows how relativity intertwined with 
an intellectual context that has been roundly ignored by historians and philosophers of science 
and presents one of history’s most iconic scientists in new light. 
The debate in question contested the essence of time. For Einstein, time’s intrinsic physical 
characteristics had nothing to do with the individual’s fickle experience of it. Bergson championed 
the essential role of human experience in understanding “full-blooded” Time—a concept he 
capitalized to distinguish it from the physical variable t. Canales situates this debate in the center 
of both men’s professional lives, as well as the European intelligentsia’s understanding of relativity. 
The physicist and the philosopher contested not just the definition of time, but jurisdiction over it. 
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In making this case, Canales explores a dimension of the theory’s reception absent from nearly all 
other historical treatments.  
The novel contribution to Einstein studies is but one aspect of the book’s significance. 
This review considers it both as a piece of historical scholarship and as an artifact of its context. 
The Physicist and the Philosopher is equal parts frustrating and impressive. As a crossover title, it 
struggles to balance the needs of popular and scholarly audiences and so leaves its most tantalizing 
lines of argument underdeveloped. At the same time, it uncovers an all-but-forgotten episode by 
bringing together a wide array of sources in a way that exemplifies how the technological 
reordering of historical sources enables new kinds of arguments. Just as much as the debate it 
describes, this book reflects the pressures of its time, providing a platform from which to raise 
critical questions about those pressures and to comment on what they augur for the practice of 
history and philosophy of science. 
 
2. The book in overview 
The Physicist and the Philosopher belongs to the long historiographical tradition examining the 
reception of relativity.1 The extent of this literature is due not only to the conceptual importance 
of relativity or the celebrity of its architect, but also, as Andrew Warwick suggests in his study of 
special relativity’s arrival at the Cavendish Laboratory, to its origin in one paper by a single 
author.2 Relativity in its initial form was compact and, Warwick argues, was not a full-fledged 
theory that elicited reactions, but rather a provocative approach to longstanding problems that 
invited active reinterpretations. The physicists who populated an increasingly international 
community sought to integrate relativistic insights into practices that still exhibited considerable 
local variation. These characteristics have encouraged historians to use special relativity like a 
physicist might use a test particle, to map out the prevailing lines of conceptual, social, and 
ideological force in diverse intellectual, institutional, and national contexts.3 
                                                
1 Glick (1987) is the foundation of the genre. Notable examples of the extensive recent literature include 
Hu (2007), Wazeck (2008), and Mota, et al. (2009). 
2 Einstein (1905). 
3 Warwick (1991), p. 626. Richard Staley also notes the prevalence of the “inception/reception 
methodology” in Staley (2008), p. 296. 
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By examining the protracted dispute between Einstein and Bergson, Canales places this 
test particle in a field that historical treatments of relativity have roundly ignored—continental 
philosophy. I use the term anachronistically here; the now-familiar distinction between analytic 
and continental philosophy did not become widespread until after World War II.4 Prickly 
definitional issues aside, it remains rare to find Bergson in histories of relativity. Where he appears 
at all, his views tend to be briskly dismissed, for example as obdurate vitalism,5 or considered 
primarily for their role in souring the Nobel committee toward relativity.6 Canales quotes the 
sentiment, evidently drawn from a pre-publication review, that the Einstein-Bergson tussle has 
been “deservedly forgotten” (p. 359). Defying this sentiment, she aims to rehabilitate Bergson’s 
image as a serious thinker—on scientific as well as philosophical matters—who influenced both 
Einstein and the reception of his theory.7 Following Warwick, implicitly if not explicitly, Canales 
emphasizes the critical reinterpretations of relativity initiated by Bergson and his allies. She argues, 
first, that the friction between Einstein and Bergson helped establish the intellectual divisions that 
shape scholarly discourse to this day, and second, that parrying the philosopher’s attacks 
reinforced Einstein’s own understanding of his best-known contribution to physics. The surprising 
claim is not that philosophical concerns imprinted themselves upon relativity and its reception—a 
point that has been made before8—but that the imprint owed just as much to voluptuous 
Bergsonism as to the hard-edged Vienna Circle positivists. 
Two short sections frame the book. The first introduces the controversy and describes its 
stakes. Not merely squabbling over how to interpret a parameter in a new and provocative theory, 
the physicist and the philosopher wrangled over whose profession held authority over time. The 
question of what interpretations relativity permitted had implications for the cultural authority of 
both science and philosophy, which had only recently become distinct after centuries of unity in 
the form of natural philosophy. The two brief chapters of the closing section describe how 
Einstein and Bergson reflected on their protracted disagreement at the end of their respective lives. 
                                                
4 For a historical overview of the analytic/continental distinction and its significance and difficulties, see 
Critchley (1997). 
5 Wazeck (2008), pp. 101-102. 
6 Topper (2013). 
7 In this sense, the book recalls Shapin & Schaffer (1986), which similarly resuscitates Thomas Hobbes’s 
criticisms of Robert Boyle. 
8 E.g., Howard (2005), van Dongen (2010). 
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It is tempting to assume that the debate’s absence from present-day histories of relativity betrays 
the totality of Bergson’s defeat. Canales suggests that this interpretation is incomplete, invoking 
Einstein’s acknowledgment that, however much he thought Bergson misguided, the philosopher’s 
critiques stayed with him. 
Two lengthy partitions between these bookends recount parallel interpretations of the 
Einstein-Bergson debate. In the first of these, which traces the contours of the disagreement within 
the intellectual and political context of interwar Europe, Canales toys with the dimensions of her 
own historical narrative. The story jumps in time and space around the 6 April 1922 meeting in 
Paris at which Einstein and Bergson publically aired their disagreements, preceding the publication 
later that year of Bergson’s critique of relativity, Duration and Simultaneity. We learn how Einstein 
and Bergson settled into their positions against an intricate backdrop that includes the birth of 
logical empiricism, interwar internationalism, the rise of fascism and anti-Semitism in Germany, 
the confounding variable of quantum mechanics, and the Catholic church’s reaction to the early-
twentieth century revision of our basic understanding of the physical world. These sixteen 
peripatetic chapters attempt to overcome the perception, prevalent within both the contemporary 
scientific community and current historical discourse, that Bergson simply did not understand 
Einstein. This perception, Canales contends, precipitated the erosion of Bergson’s once-
unassailable reputation, contributing to the persistent belief that his critiques are of little interest. 
The second major partition explores relativity’s technological milieu. The steam engines 
and dynamos of the industrial revolution have long been understood as intertwined with the 
theoretical development of nineteenth-century thermodynamics and electromagnetism.9 Relativity 
represented a more abstract phase of physics; it obviated the need for a mechanical ether and its 
effects lay beyond typical human experience. Peter Galison’s study of relativity’s technological 
context suggests that this supposedly more abstract approach nonetheless depended on things.10 
Canales proceeds in the same vein, describing how clocks, moving pictures, and sound recordings 
became ammunition for both sides of the feud. More accurate chronometers convinced scientists 
that they could impartially access abstract time. Films shaped understanding of reversibility in 
                                                
9 See Hunt (2010) for an overview of the relationship between nineteenth century science and technology. 
A detailed example is developed in Lazaroff-Puck (2015). 
10 Galison (2003). 
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physical law and irreversibility in the observed world. Recording devices redefined what it meant to 
be an observer. Canales uses the material culture of the era to engender sympathy for Bergson and 
to defend the role philosophy could play in such a context. She shows that each figure relied on 
technological examples to advance his position and suggests that Bergson was correct that the 
essential role of instrumentation in the language of relativity posed a genuine philosophical 
problem for Einstein’s abstract conception of time. The newness of the early twentieth century’s 
technological ecology raised questions about the type of access human beings could have to the 
architecture of the physical world and what we could conclude about it as a result. 
The remainder of this review focuses on the book as an artifact of the present historical 
moment. The next section considers how the book balances popular and scholarly readership as a 
way to comment on some of its limitations. Section four treats it as a product of our own 
technological context as a way of highlighting its strengths and exposing the possibilities it makes 
evident. The conclusion illuminates on the book’s importance in light of recent clashes between 
physics and philosophy. 
 
3. Who is history for? 
The Physicist and the Philosopher is pitched as a crossover title. It undertakes a serious intervention in 
the scholarly literature; however, for all its dalliances with the now recherché concerns of 
Bergsonian philosophy, it aims to remain accessible to popular audiences. Canales, with a fluid, 
readable style, answers calls for historians of science to transcend the strict dichotomy between 
“densely footnoted articles in flatfooted prose, bristling with new insights that will barely see the 
light of day [and] popular accounts of science that our colleagues will not respect as significant 
contributions to knowledge,” as Paula Findlen eloquently puts it.11 The book sometimes falters in 
the attempt to juggle the needs of general and scholarly audiences, with the result that it is likely to 
frustrate both. 
The pressures at work are evident as early as the subtitle, Einstein, Bergson, and the debate that 
changed our understanding of time. It foretells a reductionist narrative, which, despite Canales’s 
engagement with social, intellectual, political, and technological contexts, exerts discernible 
gravitational effects on the book’s trajectory. The reader looking for the story of how one 
                                                
11 Findlen (2005), 236-7. 
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encounter between two intellectuals precipitated myriad changes in both science and the academy 
is free to extract it, and sometimes encouraged to do so. The tale of the great men who changed 
the world is seductive, especially when the men in question are engaged in the conference hall 
equivalent of a barroom brawl. 
This, to be fair, is not the story that predominates for the more historically sensitive reader. 
The titular controversy was much larger than a disagreement between two men, and Einstein and 
Bergson were as much symptomatic of it as etiological. But the fuller picture of the debate as 
reflective of its context is obscured when the temptations of the more salable narrative prevail. 
Recent philosophical work, for example, situates Bergson’s interactions with Einstein within a 
longer downward trajectory of the philosopher’s reputation.12 Canales recognizes that Bergson had 
been the target of attacks from the likes of Hans Reichenbach and Bertrand Russell before his 
encounter with Einstein, but too neatly presents the debate with Einstein as the proximate cause 
of Bergson’s decline. Canales also overstates the case for the Einstein-Bergson encounter as a prime 
mover when she sells the book’s importance as the story of a personal encounter that “opened up a 
veritable ‘can of worms’ that lasted for the next hundred years” (p. 15). Subsequent pages furnish 
ample evidence that the worms were loose well before Einstein and Bergson had cause to quarrel, 
but a richer engagement with that story, which a scholarly audience might desire, falls victim to the 
interests of a competing readership. 
A second consequence of concessions to the popular palate is that explanations of the 
debate’s conceptual content stop short of the level of detail that might intimidate a lay reader 
leafing through a display copy. The particulars of both the scientific and philosophical concepts at 
issue are often imprecise. In recounting one of relativity’s most powerful successes, resolving the 
anomalous advance of the perihelion of Mercury, Canales explains: “According to Newtonian 
theory, Mercury’s perihelion should advance by approximately 600", but observations fell short of 
that number” (p. 174). This explanation will likely remain opaque to anyone unaware that the 
relevant measure is seconds of arc per century—that is, the planet’s closest approach to the sun 
undergoes a set angular displacement per every 100 orbital revolutions.13 This example is minor, 
but symptomatic of a more pervasive tendency to gloss over the bedeviled details. 
                                                
12 Guerlac (2006). 
13 See Earman & Janssen (1993). 
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Cursory treatments of both the physics and the philosophy make it difficult to evaluate 
some critical premises. Much of the dialogue between Einstein and Bergson involved competing 
interpretations of the twin paradox, Paul Langevin’s famed observation that an observer who 
completed a round trip on a relativistic rocket ship would have aged less than an earthbound twin. 
It is essential to Canales’s argument that Bergson understood the paradox fully and argued 
accordingly—not just in terms of special relativity, for which Langevin originally proposed it, but as 
a problem in general relativity, which was how Einstein had cast it by the early 1920s.14 Special 
relativity, restricted to inertially moving frames, could not accommodate the acceleration required 
for a traveler to return to Earth. 
In 1953, Bergson’s bulldog, Édouard Le Roy, penned a letter to Rose-Marie Mossé-Bastide, 
who was completing a doctoral thesis on Bergson.15 His letter, reprinted as the preface to the 
seventh edition of Duration and simultaneity, recounted Bergson’s conviction “that the defective 
state of his knowledge of mathematics did not allow him to follow the development of generalized 
relativity in the detail such a development required” and cited this as the reason Bergson allowed 
the his principle critique of Einstein to fall out of print after the sixth edition of 1931.16 Bergson’s 
evident discomfort with the mathematics of the general theory challenges the premise that he was a 
fully competent interlocutor. Canales notes that his focus was limited to special relativity, and that 
he recognized both the role of acceleration in the twin paradox and the need for a generalized 
version of the theory, but skirts the question of how his lack of proficiency with general relativity 
as it stood at the time of his 1922 meeting with Einstein colors his critique. 
More problematic than imprecise descriptions of the physics are the sometimes-cursory 
reconstructions of the relevant philosophical positions. Bergson, a veritable unknown next to 
Einstein, begins at a disadvantage with modern audiences. Canales allows that Bergson’s illiteracy 
in the formalism of general relativity constituted his main weakness, but qualifies: “the 
philosopher expanded his work to account for the problem of acceleration. Yet his clarifications 
on this topic were largely ignored. Because Bergson was largely considered to have been ‘mistaken,’ 
readers forgot one of his central messages: that philosophy had the right to study the processes that 
                                                
14 See Janssen (2012). 
15 Later published as Mossé-Bastide (1955). 
16 Bergson (1968); translated in Lawlor & Leonard (2013). 
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lead us to infer certain conclusions from directly ascertainable (yet limited) observations, in science 
and in general” (p. 66). We do not, however, get a description of how acceleration figured into 
Bergson’s interpretation and how we should therefore understand his position with respect to 
general relativity. Even a reader sympathetic to the claim that philosophy should not be frozen out 
of such discussions is left floundering without the means to assess the substance of Bergson’s 
stance. 
To assuage such concerns, the book appeals to the authority of Einstein himself. He clearly 
cared about Bergson’s critique, which he discussed in detail with his close confidants. We are 
invited to believe that he did so because Bergson grasped something substantive about the science. 
This is an interesting possibility, but it is not adequately demonstrated here, especially given the 
host of other reasons Einstein had to care that an influential philosopher, a fellow Jew, and an 
potential political ally in a troubled Europe so directly attacked his conclusions. Canales shows 
that some of these factors are individually insufficient to account for Einstein’s reaction, but even 
in aggregate those refutations do not prove the premise. The book’s most intriguing possibility, 
that Bergson’s objections influenced Einstein’s own thinking about his theory, is thereby sold 
short by inadequate support from the nuanced physical and philosophical concepts in play. 
The result of Canales’s attempts to keep her analysis of subtle and technical disagreements 
palatable to a range of readers is twofold. First, audiences not already versed in the relevant physics 
and philosophy are left with incomplete reconstructions of details that very much mattered to the 
interlocutors themselves. Because readers learn a great deal about how Einstein reacted to 
Bergson’s position but get only a taste of the position itself, the committed acolytes of science who 
comprise the likely non-professional readership are unlikely to be convinced that Bergson’s 
position is worth consideration. Second, scholarly readers are too often invited to take the author’s 
most critical assumptions—such as the virtue of Bergson’s philosophical stance—on faith or 
authority, and so will have difficulty evaluating the arguments. 
These criticisms are not meant to suggest that historians should disavow engaging wider 
audiences, only that doing so requires striking a balance. The way this particular balance is struck 
has consequences for the way the argument unfolds. Once historians accept that bringing scholarly 
insights to wider audiences is necessary and desirable, we face the question of how engaging such 
audiences is likely to shape the construction of historical arguments, as they appear to have done 
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here. Those questions have largely been left to be worked out in practice. If, however, more 
historians begin working in the genre this book exemplifies, more conscious attention to them is 
warranted. 
 
4. Technology and the material culture of history 
When introducing the material culture of relativity, Canales makes an observation that applies just 
as well to the practice of history today: “As much as they resisted the very idea of ‘technology,’ 
neither Bergson nor Einstein were immune from living through the vast changes in the material 
culture of their era” (p. 243). Similarly vast changes are now occurring in the way historians 
confront source material. This book, while describing how such technological shifts shaped bygone 
eras, demonstrates how our own technological environment influences historical practice. 
The Physicist and the Philosopher, like relativity, appears deceptively aloof from its 
technological context. Canales, by all indications, relies on traditional, time-honored, and 
decidedly low-tech interpretive techniques. Nevertheless, her analysis draws together sources in a 
way that presupposes the intricate technological infrastructure historians now rely upon to access 
both primary and secondary materials. Rapidly accessing sources that are available in full text 
online, or are digitally catalogued, constitutes a new capability, a difference in kind from the days 
when it was impossible to place sources in dialogue without traveling to distant libraries, wearing 
out one’s welcome with the interlibrary loan service, and stuffing filing cabinets with reams of 
photocopies. William Cronon, observing these and similar changes, notes: “None of us really has a 
clue what that future looks like.”17 With this book, Canales offers one vision of that future, in 
which the new capabilities that come with source digitization influence the substance of historians’ 
questions and the texture of their answers. 
Permit me an anecdotal illustration. A colleague of mine recently asked me what I knew 
about the origins of the hard science/soft science distinction, a topic that had arisen in one of her 
class discussions. The answer was not much. Not long ago, that might have been the end of it. 
With quick reference to digital sources, however, I was able to identify early uses “soft science” in 
the 1940s, where the term grew through a surprising dual use, as a funding category on one hand 
and a science fiction subgenre on the other. I could locate the likely origin of the term “hard 
                                                
17 Cronon (2012, January). 
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science” in Roger Ascham’s sixteenth-century treatise The Scholemaster, about the education of 
wealthy scions. Ascham’s often-quoted passage referring to “hie and hard sciences” ensured that 
“hard science” was firmly established well before the hard/soft dyad became prevalent in the 
1940s.18 
All the sources necessary for a preliminary response to my colleague’s question are available 
in our university’s library. But addressing it even superficially with any alacrity was only possible 
because of a suite of search tools and digitized texts. I do not mean to wax quixotic about Google 
Books and its brethren. Keyword searches are no substitute for genuine scholarship; the type of 
answers they provide are necessarily partial and frequently misleading. Nevertheless, they have a 
novel ability to raise useful questions because of the character of the access they provide. It is unlikely 
that I would have so easily wondered about the parallels between hard/soft science and hard/soft 
science fiction, or to dig as far back as the 1570s, without digital tools. The ability to directly 
compare a great diversity of sources—all of which were previously available—in a short span of time 
is a genuinely new capability with subtle, but sizable consequences for historical practice. 
The juxtaposition of sources from distant intellectual siloes is precisely the strength of 
Canales’s analysis. The Physicist and the Philosopher describes how now-familiar taxa of scholarly 
inquiry first differentiated: how the rift between analytic and continental philosophy grew and 
how science and philosophy became established as separate, sometimes antagonistic professions. It 
is a story that likely could not have been told even ten years ago. In principle, nothing prevented 
historians from accessing Canales’s sources and noticing their significance to one another earlier. 
In practice, however, it is nearly inconceivable that anyone could have drawn all the 
interdisciplinary and international connections this book makes, against such a rich contextual 
backdrop, before widespread source digitization and electronic cataloging. I do not presume to 
know precisely how the author assembled her materials—a feature of historical practice that 
citation conventions render opaque—but the conspicuous alignment between opportunities 
created by digital organization of sources and Canales’s historical perspective offers an opportunity 
to comment on issues made immediate by rapid changes in our own technological context. 
When considering changes in practice, historians of science have given sustained attention 
to two related issues, often in conjunction. First, studying the large, complex scientific 
                                                
18 Ascham (1870), p. 32. 
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communities that emerged in the twentieth century presents gnarly problems of scale. As David 
Kaiser observes, methods optimized for detailed case studies rooted in archival sources “seem to be 
no match for the brute fact of exponential growth” of twentieth-century scientific workforces.19 
Second, digital history methods present both the potential for new modes of inquiry and the 
challenge of working out fresh standards to govern them. 
Proposed responses to these issues include reimagining historical labor in a manner 
analogous to mid-twentieth century changes in scientific labor. Babak Ashrafi, acknowledging that 
humanists tend to be “determined individualists,” suggests that embracing the collaborative spirit 
is one way for historians to manage the complexities of large, collaborative scientific 
communities.20 Out of the Crystal Maze, a history of solid state physics—itself a large, unfocused 
field—that resulted from a long-term international collaboration, epitomized this style of “big 
history.”21 That this remains the exemplar after more than two decades, however, indicates the 
resilience of humanistic individualism. Although collaborations might now be a more realistic 
option for historians, they have not become the norm. 
Another family of responses focuses on how digital tools can inform historical 
methodology. These proposals range from the modest to the elaborate. Kaiser suggests that 
historians can manage complex historical problems by using simple quantitative approaches to 
supplement archival and textual study. Examining the raw quantity of physics PhDs awarded in the 
United States in the twentieth century, for instance, reveals a boom-and-bust cycle that implies 
consequences for the way physics was practiced at various stages of the cycle.22 At the more 
ambitious end of the spectrum, the Embryo Project at Arizona State University develops intricate 
web-based tools that aim to enrich historical analyses by characterizing community structures and 
collaborations, and to allow scientists to frame their research using historical perspectives.23 
I sketch these examples as a foil. The Physicist and the Philosopher is a null case with respect to 
all of them. Canales is the lone author and shows no sign of using digital methods, simple or 
sophisticated, to assess her sources. Even so, the features discussed above—the thickness of the 
                                                
19 Kaiser (2012), p. 276. 
20 Ashrafi (2007), p. 9. 
21 Hoddeson, et al. (1992). 
22 Kaiser (2012). 
23 Maienschein & Laubichler (2010). 
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background description, the diversity of the source base, the illuminating boundary crossing—
exhibit features attributable to a shifting technological context. The manner in which historians 
interpret primary documents has not substantially altered, but support structures that enable those 
interpretations has. Changes in the scaffolding that helps historians build their arguments implies 
changes the form of those arguments. The implication is that the substance of historical work and 
the standards used to evaluate it are likely to change even in the most conservative vision of how 
digital technologies will alter the historian’s craft. 
As of now, the growing network of cataloguing services, digitized sources, and keyword-
searchable databases represents the possibility of consulting a wider array of sources in order to tell 
a story that cuts across specializations and speaks to large-scale historical themes. Although a 
possibility now, it bespeaks a coming necessity. For some time, historians of science have called for 
scholarship to move beyond close micro-historical analysis and address thematic elements common 
to many sciences or historical processes.24 Easy access to sources from around the world, 
crosscutting disciplines, nations, and languages, makes this demand ever the more reasonable. It is 
easy to imagine how the type of linkages Canales uses to find a new angle on a well-known story 
could become the norm in historical exposition. Incremental changes to the process of source 
access, although they appear tame in comparison to the ways digital technologies can alter or 
supplement interpretive methods, might have the more pervasive effect on the discipline. 
Some qualifications are in order. Canales, writing about Einstein and his contemporaries, 
moves over well-trodden ground and investigates a context that does not exhibit the scale effects 
Kaiser identifies. But beyond the peculiarities of this topic, the issue remains that historians’ 
practices have already subtly changed in the ways we interact with our materials and therefore in 
the way we frame questions and develop answers to them. These changes, quite apart from the 
more radical possibilities offered by new forms of evidence or modes of interpretation, raise 
questions that demand further consideration. Do new technologies create a need for greater 
transparency in how we locate and access sources? How does easy access to a wider array of sources 
change our expectations for scholarly due diligence?25 We have historically trusted professional 
librarians and archivists to maintain and curate the documents we need. Are we prepared to cede 
                                                
24 See: Kaiser (2005); Kohler (2005); Kohler & Olesko (2012). 
25 See Rekdal (2014). 
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that responsibility to algorithms? Will corporate hold over access to primary sources undermine 
the democratic potential of the Internet the same way some worry that it has with secondary 
sources?26 It is beyond the scope of this review—and the ken of this reviewer—to attempt answers 
here, but these issues are current, pressing, and demand attention whether or not we embrace the 
promises and repercussions of full-blooded digital history. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Taken as a whole, The Physicist and the Philosopher chronicles the growth of deep and abiding rifts 
among Western intelligentsia. The Einstein-Bergson debate presaged the schism between 
continental and analytic approaches to philosophy. It unfolded amid the political disquiet of 
interwar Europe and the technologies that suffused it. Most critically, it exposed the rift between 
science and philosophy, both as professions and as sources of cultural authority, the battle for 
which science was beginning to win. The book closes with a postscript nodding to recent 
skirmishes over similar turf. The so-called “science wars” of the 1990s saw attempts from the heirs 
of Bergson’s philosophical tradition to wrest from science some of the influence it had begun to 
amass in Einstein’s day, and which, during the Cold War, had been deployed in service of the 
national security state in the United States.27 Some scientists, perceiving the philosophers involved 
as speaking out of turn, responded combatively.28 
The echoes of these disputes continue to reverberate, pushing science and philosophy 
farther apart. Steven Weinberg, the public face of American high energy physics, is famously 
hostile to philosophy.29 He recently drew the ire of historians as well by dismissing long-accepted 
admonitions to consider historical events and actors within the contexts provided by their own 
values and assumptions with a curt, “I don’t buy it.”30 Stephen Hawking, perhaps the most iconic 
physicist since Einstein himself, is no more accommodating of humanistic incursions into 
scientific turf, and has irked philosophers as a result.31 Neil deGrasse Tyson, among today’s most 
                                                
26 On this last question, see Alberti (2010, June) and Cronon (2012, January). 
27 Bridger (2015). 
28 E.g., Sokal (1998). 
29 Weinberg (1992). 
30 Weinberg (2015), p. 29; Pesic (2015). 
31 Hawking and Mlodinow (2010); Norris (2011). 
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potent science communicators, considers philosophy obsolete in the face of scientific advance.32 
Amid widespread concern about the future of the humanities in an increasingly market-driven 
academy, understanding the historical origins of these sentiments becomes all the more essential. 
The Physicist and the Philosopher should be read in light of persistent questions about disciplinary 
and cultural values. The philosopher might have ended up on the wrong side of his squabble with 
the physicist, but his insistence that Einstein’s view of time rested on deep metaphysical 
assumptions that did not follow unproblematically from the architecture of his theory reflects an 
unresolved point of contention between physicists and philosophers in particular, and science and 
the humanities in general. 
When combined with its significance for historical practice, this book’s relevance for 
current professional issues makes it worthy of careful attention, even when at its most 
confounding. As the title of this review suggests, Canales’s telling of the story portends “new straw 
for the old broom.”33 The way she wields the tools of the trade suggests nothing unorthodox, but 
where the bristles of the besom meet the hardwood of history, changes in audiences and access 
technologies make for a narrative that is new in ways that speak to the identity of history and 
philosophy of science and, for better or ill, hint at features of its future. 
 
Acknowledgments 
Thanks to Margaret Charleroy, Richard Oosterhoff, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful 
commentary. 
 
References 
Alberti, F. B. (2010, June 23). Democratic access to academic knowledge. Open Democracy. 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/fay-bound-alberti/briefing-on-open-access-and-policy-
reform. (Accessed 6 August 2015) 
Ascham, R. (1870). The scholemaster (English reprints ed.). Birmingham: Edward Arber. (First 
Published 1573) 
                                                
32 Pigliucci (2014). 
33 I have cribbed this phrase from Darnielle (2005). 
 
 15 
Ashrafi, B. (2007). Big history? In K. Gavroglu & J. Renn (Eds.), Positioning the history of science (pp. 
7-11). Dordrecht: Springer. 
Bergson, H. (1968). Durée et simultanéité (7th ed.). Paris: Les Presses universitaires de France. (First 
published 1922) 
Bridger, S. (2015). Scientists at war: The ethics of cold war weapons research. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 
Critchley, S. (1997). What is continental philosophy? International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 5, 
347-363. 
Cronon, W. (2012, January). The public practice of history in and for a digital age. Perspectives on 
History 50(1). http://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/perspectives-on-
history/january-2012/the-public-practice-of-history-in-and-for-a-digital-age. (Accessed 12 
August 2015) 
Darnielle, J. (2005). Broom people. The sunset tree. London: 4AD. 
Earman, J. & Janssen, M. (1993). Einstein’s explanation of the motion of Mercury’s perihelion. In 
J. Earman, M. Janssen, & J. Norton (Eds.), The attraction of gravitation: New studies in the 
history of general relativity (pp. 129-172). Basel: Birkhaüser. 
Einstein, A. (1905). Zur Elektrodynamik bewegter Körper. Annalen der Physik, 322, 891-921. 
Findlen, P. (2005). The two cultures of scholarship. Isis, 96, 230-237. 
Galison, P. (2003). Einstein’s clocks, Poincaré’s maps: Empires of time. New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
Glick, T. F. (Ed.). (1987). The comparative reception of relativity. Boston: D. Reidel. 
Guerlac, S. (2006). Thinking in time: an introduction to Henri Bergson. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Hawking, S. & Mlodinow, L. (2010). The grand design: New answers to the ultimate questions of life. 
New York: Bantam. 
Hoddeson, L., Braun, E., Teichmann, J., & Weart, S. (Eds.). (1992). Out of the crystal maze: 
Chapters from the history of solid-state physics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Howard, D. (2005). Einstein as a philosopher of science. Physics Today, 58(12), 34-40. 
Hu, D. (2007). The reception of relativity in china. Isis, 98, 539-557. 
Hunt, B. J. (2010). Pursuing power and light: Technology and physics from James Watt to Albert Einstein. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 16 
Janssen, M. (2012). The twins and the bucket: How Einstein made gravity rather than motion 
relative in general relativity. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 43, 159-175. 
Kaiser, D. (2005). Training and the generalist’s vision in the history of science. Isis, 96, 244-251.  
Kaiser, D. (2012). Booms, busts, and the world of ideas: Enrollment pressures and the challenge of 
specialization. Osiris, 27, 276-302. 
Kohler, R. (2005). A generalist’s vision. Isis, 96, 224-229. 
Kohler, R. E. & Olesko, K. M. (2012). Introduction: Clio meets science. Osiris, 27, 1-16. 
Lawlor, L. & Leonard, V. M. (2013). Henri Bergson. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.) The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/bergson/. (Accessed 9 
August 9 2015) 
Lazaroff-Puck, C. (2015). Gearing up for Lagrangian dynamics. Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 
69, 455-490. 
Maienschein, J. & Laubichler, M. D. (2010). The embryo project: An integrated approach to 
history, practices, and social contexts of embryo research. Journal of the History of Biology, 43, 
1-16. 
Mossé-Bastide, R-M. (1955). Bergson, éducateur. Paris: Presses universitaires de Frances. 
Mota, E., Crawford, P., & Simões, A. (2009). Einstein in Portugal: Eddington's expedition to 
Principe and the reactions of Portuguese astronomers (1917–25). The British Journal for the 
History of Science, 42, 245-273. 
Norris, C. (2011). Hawking contra philosophy. Philosophy Now, 82. 
https://philosophynow.org/issues/82/Hawking_contra_Philosophy. (Accessed 22 July 
2015) 
Pesic, P. (2015). Essay review: Steven Weinberg, To explain the world: The discovery of modern science. 
Physics in Perspective, 17, 156-160. 
Pigliucci, M. (2014). Neil deGrasse Tyson and the value of philosophy. Scientia Salon, 12 May. 
https://scientiasalon.wordpress.com/2014/05/12/neil-degrasse-tyson-and-the-value-of-
philosophy/. (Accessed 7 August 2015). 
Rekdal, O. B. (2014). Academic urban legends. Social Studies of Science, 44, 638-654. 
 17 
Shapin, S. & Schaffer, S. (1985). Leviathan and the air pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the experimental life. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Sokal, A. (1998). What the Social Text affair does and does not prove. Critical Quarterly, 40, 3-18. 
Staley, R. (2008). Einstein's generation: The origins of the relativity revolution. Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press. 
Topper, D. (2013). How Einstein created relativity out of physics and astronomy. New York: Springer. 
van Dongen, J. (2010). Einstein's unification. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Warwick, A. (1992). Cambridge mathematics and Cavendish physics: Cunningham, Campbell and 
Einstein’s relativity 1905-1911, part I: the uses of theory.” Studies in History and Philosophy of 
Science, 23, 625-656. 
Wazeck, M. (2008). Einstein's opponents: The public controversy about the theory of relativity. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Weinberg, S. (1992). Dreams of a final theory. New York: Random House. 
Weinberg, S. (2015). To explain the world: The discovery of modern science. New York: Harper Collins. 
 
